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We used a deterministic SEIR (susceptible-exposed-
infectious-removed) meta-population model, together with
scenario, sensitivity, and simulation analyses, to determine
stockpiling strategies for neuraminidase inhibitors that
would minimize absenteeism among healthcare workers. A
pandemic with a basic reproductive number (R0) of 2.5
resulted in peak absenteeism of 10%. Treatment
decreased peak absenteeism to 8%, while 8 weeks’ pro-
phylaxis reduced it to 2%. For pandemics with higher R0,
peak absenteeism exceeded 20% occasionally and 6
weeks’ prophylaxis reduced peak absenteeism by 75%.
Insufficient duration of prophylaxis increased peak absen-
teeism compared with treatment only. Earlier pandemic
detection and initiation of prophylaxis may render shorter
prophylaxis durations ineffective. Eight weeks’ prophylaxis
substantially reduced peak absenteeism under a broad
range of assumptions for severe pandemics (peak absen-
teeism >10%). Small investments in treatment and prophy-
laxis, if adequate and timely, can reduce absenteeism
among essential staff.
C
oncerns regarding the advent and impact of the next
influenza pandemic have led >120 countries to devel-
op pandemic preparedness plans (1). Studies have shown
that treatment with neuraminidase inhibitors and prophy-
laxis of selected subpopulations are cost-effective strate-
gies to limit the pandemic’s impact on the healthcare
system (2,3). However, supplies of neuraminidase
inhibitors are limited, and countries may not have the
financial resources to purchase large stockpiles. Policy-
makers will thus have to determine priorities for treatment
and prophylaxis.
One priority is to maintain essential services during
the pandemic’s peak—to ensure business continuity and
mitigate the resultant damage. Absenteeism of essential
staff from work should be minimized to prevent service
disruption when most needed. This is particularly crucial
for healthcare workers (HCWs) because they may have an
increased risk for exposure and illness while facing a surge
in demand for healthcare services.
A recent study proposed that hospitals should consid-
er stockpiling neuraminidase inhibitors for treatment and
prophylaxis (4). To provide policy guidance to reduce the
pandemic’s impact on HCWs, this study analyzed the use
of neuraminidase inhibitors in minimizing absenteeism by
simulating an HCW population in a transmission dynamics
model.
Methods
Model Structure and Dynamics
We used a deterministic, modified SEIR (susceptible-
exposed-infectious-removed) meta-population model to
evaluate strategies for minimizing absenteeism among
HCWs during an influenza pandemic. The model consist-
ed of 2 distinct populations in Singapore: the general pop-
ulation and an HCW population (Figure 1A). Singapore’s
mid-year population in 2005 was 4.35 million, and the
public HCW population of 20,000 represented essential
staff that required protection. Oseltamivir was the neu-
raminidase-inhibitor modeled because of its effectiveness
in treatment and prophylaxis, good safety profile, and
common use in national stockpiles (5–8). Standard treat-
ment regimen was 75 mg, twice per day for 5 days, and
prophylaxis required 75 mg once per day for as long as
planned.
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*Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore This study assumed that the general population did not
receive treatment or prophylaxis with oseltamivir. Three
strategies for HCWs were considered: no action (providing
symptomatic relief), treatment only (early treatment of all
symptomatic HCW infections), and prophylaxis (prophy-
laxis together with early treatment). Different predeter-
mined prophylaxis substrategies were considered, based
on the weeks of prophylaxis; each additional week
required 140,000 doses in addition to separate treatment
stockpiles. To be conservative, we assumed that prophy-
laxis stockpiles would last only for the planned duration.
Separate analyses explored the effect of stopping prophy-
laxis after individual clinical infection, with redistribution
of prophylaxis doses to other HCWs to prolong prophylax-
is beyond the planned duration; however, this strategy is
only possible if tests can promptly confirm individual
infection and logistics networks allow for redistribution.
We assumed that all persons were susceptible to the
pandemic virus and that the general population epidemic
occurred as a single wave after introduction of a single
infectious case. We ignored the contribution of new intro-
ductions after the start of the epidemic. Persons were
removed from the susceptible state, after infection,
through recovery or death (Figure 1A). Births, deaths from
other causes, immigration, and emigration during the
period were assumed to be negligible.
We assumed a range of infectious periods similar to
those from other studies; we also assumed that the disease
was infectious at about the same time a person became
symptomatic; i.e., the latent period coincided with the
incubation period (9,10). A range of basic reproductive
numbers (R0), based on these infectious and latent periods,
were then used to generate epidemics in the general popu-
lation with varying rates of transmission. These R0 then
determined the course of the HCW epidemic.
HCWs were assumed to be exposed to influenza from
3 sources and may be more likely to be exposed than the
general population (11). The first source was exposures
from colleagues (HCW-to-HCW transmission) at a propor-
tion (ω); the second was from persons outside the work-
place (1–ω). In the absence of published estimates, the
base case assumed that 50% of infections were attributed
to HCW-to-HCW transmission, with sensitivity analysis
performed from 20% to 80%. The third source was from
general population case-patients (patient-to-HCW trans-
mission), expressed as the ratio of susceptible HCWs who
could be infected by incident case-patients who sought
treatment from the healthcare system (H/P). The extent of
transmission is dependent on interventions such as barrier
precautions (11). On the basis of findings from explorato-
ry analysis, increasing the H/P ratio moves the HCW epi-
demic earlier; at an H/P of 2.08, the HCW epidemic peaks
before the start of prophylaxis, negating the outcomes of
prophylaxis. Therefore, H/P values >2 do not substantially
contribute to the outcomes and study conclusions, and sen-
sitivity analysis was performed for H/P from 0 to 2 (online
Technical Appendix, available at www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/13/3/449_app.htm). Transmission from HCWs to
patients was assumed negligible compared with other
sources of infection for the general population, and the
general population epidemic was independent of transmis-
sion dynamics within the HCW population.
Once infected, an HCW would have 4 outcomes based
on absenteeism (Figure 1B). Those with asymptomatic
infection were assumed to be fit for work. Absenteeism
due to symptomatic infection, hospitalization, and death
was determined for the different strategies. The study
assumed that all HCWs were absent from work while
symptomatic and that prophylaxis reduced HCW-to-HCW
transmission (9). Each scenario was further analyzed on
the basis of different R0; the disease’s incubation and infec-
tious periods were kept constant.
Pandemic Duration and Prophylaxis Initiation
The point of local detection of pandemic influenza
depends on various factors and is unknown.
Approximately 2,800 cases of influenzalike illness (ILI)
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Figure 1. A) Modified SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-
removed) model for transmission of pandemic influenza within the
general population and healthcare worker (HCW) subpopulation.
B) Absenteeism among exposed HCWs.occur per day in Singapore (2), of which a small fraction is
sampled for virologic surveillance (12). The base case
assumed that the pandemic influenza subtype would be
detected when incident symptomatic cases exceeded 10%
of baseline ILI rates. The pandemic duration was defined
as the period when incident pandemic influenza cases
remained above this stated level. Prophylaxis was given to
HCWs at the time of disease detection and continued for
the planned duration. We conducted sensitivity analysis for
starting prophylaxis on introduction of the first case and
when incident cases exceeded 1%–100% of the baseline
ILI rate.
Other Input Parameters
The input parameters for analysis (Table 1) were
obtained from local sources when available as detailed in
a previous study on stockpiling strategies in Singapore
(2). Other values were obtained from international
sources. To account for uncertainties, wide ranges were
used for analysis.
HCWs were assumed to be adults 20–64 years of age
with a mix of persons at low and high risk for influenza
complications similar to that in the general population.
Hospitalization and case-fatality rates were estimated for a
pandemic of average severity (2). To account for the effect
of severe pandemics, a scenario using death rates from the
1918 “Spanish flu” (5% average) and correlated hospital-
ization rates was performed (19).
Outcome Variables and Sensitivity Analysis
Outcome variables from the analyses included pan-
demic duration, peak staff absenteeism, and days with
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severity and antiviral efficacy, 1-way sensitivity analysis
was performed to determine the effect on outcomes. In
addition, Monte Carlo simulation analysis, with 1,000 iter-
ations per scenario, was performed with the range of
parameter estimates modeled as triangular distributions.
For parameters pertaining to transmission dynamics, sepa-
rate analyses were performed to determine the effects of
variations in HCW-to-HCW and patient-to-HCW trans-
mission. We also tested the outcome effects of assuming
different latent and infectious periods. Epidemics with
similar R0 but different latent and infectious periods have
different growth rates. To facilitate comparison between
epidemics with different latent and infectious periods, both
epidemic growth rates and R0 values were presented. The
relationship between latent and infectious period, R0, and
growth rates was described by Mills et al. (14) and elabo-
rated in the Online Technical Appendix. Finally, the out-
comes were determined for the various strategies upon
initiation of prophylaxis at different times.
We used Berkeley-Madonna 8.3 software (University
of California, Berkeley, CA, USA) to run the model.
Details of the equations are shown in the Appendix; addi-
tional methods and results are shown in the Online
Technical Appendix.
Results
The epidemic curve for a base-case pandemic with R0
of 2.5 had a 12-week duration (Figure 2). When no action
was taken, peak HCW absenteeism was ≈10%. Treatment
only, using 121,000 doses of oseltamivir, decreased peak
absenteeism to 8%. Prophylaxis for 4 weeks required
117,000 treatment doses in addition to 560,000 dedicated
prophylaxis doses (equivalent to treatment courses for
1.6% of the general population) and led to higher peak
absenteeism than treatment only. Eight weeks of prophy-
laxis required 52,000 treatment doses in addition to 1.12
million dedicated prophylaxis doses (equivalent to treat-
ment courses for 2.7% of the general population) and
reduced peak absenteeism to ≈2%; the peak occurred as a
secondary increase after termination of prophylaxis.
Discontinuing prophylaxis for clinical infections and
redistributing stockpiles to prolong prophylaxis in other
HCWs did not provide additional outcome benefits
because the doses saved were insignificant; >96% were
used during the preplanned duration for the relevant sce-
narios. From the Monte Carlo simulation of peak absen-
teeism for different strategies in a pandemic with R0 of 2.5,
with varying disease severity and antiviral efficacy param-
eters, 6 weeks of prophylaxis was sufficient under all sce-
narios to have a net benefit over treatment only (Figure 3).
One-way sensitivity analyses showed that the follow-
ing input parameters had the most effect on peak absen-
teeism: “days of medical leave without treatment,” with
15%–96% variation from the baseline outcome, depending
on the R0 and strategy used; “reduction in medical leave
with treatment” with 22%–61% variation; “symptomatic
proportion in infected persons without prophylaxis” with
19%–25% variation; and “oseltamivir efficacy in prevent-
ing disease in infected persons” with 21%–87% variation.
Other input parameters had less effect on the outcome.
Table 2 shows the outcomes for pandemics with dif-
ferent R0. If no action was taken for pandemics with R0>2,
absenteeism exceeded 5% for >15 days. In pandemics with
lower R0 (≤2), pandemic durations were longer and peak
absenteeism did not exceed 10%. Treatment only in these
pandemics reduced peak absenteeism by as much as 25%
compared with no action. However, prophylaxis of ≈8
weeks did not accrue substantial benefits over treatment
only.
Pandemics with higher R0 (>4) were of shorter dura-
tions; peak absenteeism was >20% in some scenarios.
Treatment only reduced peak absenteeism by >15%, and 6
weeks of prophylaxis was sufficient to reduce peak absen-
teeism by >75% over no action. Across all R0, insufficient
durations of prophylaxis increased peak absenteeism com-
pared with results for treatment only.
During a pandemic similar in severity to the 1918
influenza pandemic, with a 5% mortality rate and R0 of 4
(14), peak absenteeism reached 20% with no action; hos-
pitalizations and deaths contributed substantially to absen-
teeism, unlike the situation in less severe pandemics. The
3 strategies—treatment only, 4 weeks of prophylaxis, and
6 weeks of prophylaxis—reduced peak absenteeism by
25%, 43%, and 80%, respectively.
We also tested the adequacy of prophylaxis for a base-
case pandemic under different scenarios for HCW-to-HCW
and patient-to-HCW transmission. Higher HCW-to-HCW
transmission resulted in an increased postprophylaxis epi-
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Figure 2. Dynamics of population infections and the effect of differ-
ent strategies on absenteeism among healthcare workers for a
base-case pandemic.demic peak. The HCW epidemic coincided with the gener-
al population epidemic if the patient-to-HCW infections
variable was minimized (H/P = 0). Increasing H/P alone
shifted the HCW epidemic such that it preceded the gener-
al population epidemic and amplified peak absenteeism by
as much as 1.4× for the base case. For the prophylaxis
strategies, increasing the patient-to-HCW transmission
resulted in the distribution of HCW absenteeism away from
the postprophylaxis period into the pre- and intraprophylax-
is periods, which resulted in lower peak absenteeism up to
a point. For H/P >2.0, peak absenteeism occurred before
initiation of prophylaxis, negating the effect of longer dura-
tions of prophylaxis. Under all HCW-to-HCW and patient-
to-HCW transmission scenarios for a base-case pandemic,
6 weeks of prophylaxis provided equal or superior results to
treatment only; 8 weeks of prophylaxis was always superi-
or (Online Technical Appendix).
Figure 4 shows the changes in peak absenteeism when
latent and infectious periods were varied. For any rate of
growth, assuming different latent periods changed peak
absenteeism by <1% for most scenarios; assuming longer
infectious periods increased peak absenteeism by <3%.
However, epidemics with higher growth rates for any
latent and infectious periods increased peak absenteeism
by >10% when no action was taken. Although changes in
the transmission parameters substantially changed peak
absenteeism levels for certain scenarios, the overall con-
clusions remained similar. For epidemics with low peak
absenteeism (<10%) and prolonged duration (low growth
rate), prophylaxis strategies were less effective than treat-
ment only. In contrast, for epidemics with higher peak
absenteeism (>10%) and shorter duration (high growth
rate), prophylaxis of >6 weeks was superior to treatment
only.
Figure 5 shows the adequacy of prophylaxis for a
base-case pandemic under different prophylaxis initiation
points based on pandemic detection. Earlier detection and
prophylaxis initiation resulted in a greater likelihood that
shorter durations of prophylaxis would be ineffective. If
prophylaxis were initiated on entry of the first pandemic
case, 14 weeks of prophylaxis would be required for max-
imal benefit. Prophylaxis for 6 weeks was more effective
than treatment only if it was initiated when incident pan-
demic cases in the general population exceeded 10% of the
ILI rate, whereas 8 weeks of prophylaxis was effective
when incident pandemic cases exceeded 1%.
Discussion
During an influenza pandemic, essential services such
as healthcare must be maintained, especially during the
pandemic’s peak, when the maximal number of patients
require care, and healthcare services can ill afford absen-
teeism due to infection. Absenteeism may also occur for
reasons such as background illnesses and the need to care
for ill relatives. During the severe acute respiratory syn-
drome epidemic in Singapore in 2003, schools were closed
for weeks. Although no study documented the resultant
workplace absenteeism, parents may have taken time off to
care for their children. The New Zealand government has
predicted overall absenteeism levels as high as 40% (20),
and actual pandemic workplace absenteeism levels will
likely exceed those shown in this study.
Absenteeism during Pandemic Influenza
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Figure 3. Simulation analysis of the difference in mean peak
absenteeism for different strategies in an R0 = 2.5 (base-case)
pandemic (50th percentile shown in solid bars with the 5th and
95th percentiles shown in error bars).Treatment and timely use of prophylaxis with neu-
raminidase inhibitors reduce HCW absenteeism compared
with no action. As shown in previous studies, treatment
provides benefits over no action and should be considered
in preparedness plans to reduce illness and death (2,3,21).
Using prophylaxis to prevent infection results in a second-
ary increase in infections after prophylaxis is stopped
because HCWs remain susceptible at a time when trans-
mission in the general population is ongoing. Insufficient
durations of prophylaxis thus result in poorer outcomes
than treatment only. For prophylaxis strategies to accrue
more benefits than treatment only, the prophylaxis dura-
tion must be sufficient to cover the pandemic’s peak. Eight
weeks of prophylaxis, the maximum safe duration previ-
ously studied (22), was sufficient to provide a substantial
reduction in peak absenteeism under a broad range of
assumptions for more severe pandemics where peak
absenteeism exceeded 10%. Six weeks of prophylaxis was
marginally beneficial, if one assumes that prophylaxis was
initiated after incident pandemic cases exceeded 10% of
the baseline ILI rate.
An important policy consideration is the timing of pro-
phylaxis initiation. Improved surveillance, critical for early
detection, paradoxically increases the likelihood of initiat-
ing prophylaxis too early, causing predetermined stockpile
durations to be inadequate. Many countries have developed
comprehensive preparedness plans to reduce a pandemic’s
spread. These may prolong the pandemic’s duration within
the country, which would compound the issue of stockpile
adequacy. If prophylaxis is started prematurely, stockpiles
will be exhausted before the delayed waves of the pandem-
ic occur and thus will not reduce absenteeism more than
would treatment only. Prophylaxis should not be initiated
until a certain point in the epidemic curve, but this may be
difficult, given public sentiment and pressure. Further stud-
ies are needed to determine the ideal time for prophylaxis
initiation and the role of surveillance in evaluating the pan-
demic phases and projected spread.
The current avian influenza outbreaks have increased
fear of an imminent severe pandemic. Pandemics of lesser
severity place fewer requirements on essential services.
Our study showed that such pandemics also result in lower
staff absenteeism rates; treatment and prophylaxis may thus
be less critical to service continuity. On the contrary, severe
pandemics increase the strain because of the numbers of
patients, hospitalizations, and deaths and the reduced
response capacity of healthcare services. For pandemics
with high mortality rates, high growth rates, or high R0,
prophylaxis provides greater benefits than it does for pan-
demics with lower mortality rates, low growth rates, or low
R0; and the required duration of prophylaxis is shorter.
Our results are subject to several limitations. The true
level of transmission in HCWs remains unknown. In a
heightened state of alertness, HCWs will be equipped with
personal protective equipment, and patient–HCW trans-
mission may be minimized, resulting in lower absenteeism
rates (10). Another limitation is that effects over the entire
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Figure 4. Peak absenteeism with different treatment (Tx) and pro-
phylaxis (Rx) strategies varying rates of growth (ζ)*, latent periods
(α), and infectious duration (γ). *ζ is the initial rate of growth of the
epidemic curve and is determined by the reproductive potential
and the infectious agent’s doubling time (T). The latter is related to
the rate of growth by the following equation: 
ζ
) 2 ln(
= THCW population were aggregated. In reality, subsets of
HCWs exist with varying levels of exposure. Stochastic
variation and nosocomial outbreaks, which were not mod-
eled, may result in higher local absenteeism rates than pre-
dicted by this model. Further studies that use
individual-based stochastic models may provide improved
representation of disease transmission to test other inter-
ventions. Studies should also consider modeling the effect
of multiple pandemic waves. Finally, the study parameters
used were based on historical data; the validity of the pro-
jections will depend on how the next pandemic compares
with its precedents.
Conclusion
Countries must consider the effects of an influenza
pandemic on essential services. Those planning neu-
raminidase inhibitor stockpiling for treatment and prophy-
laxis of essential staff should consider the relatively small
quantities required. Treatment and 8 weeks of prophylaxis
for HCWs in Singapore costs US $2 million, compared
with US $400 million for a similar populationwide stock-
pile and the ≈US $20 million spent for national stockpiling
(2). In severe pandemics, when the need for protection is
greatest, prophylaxis of short duration has a potential role
in mitigating the effects. For prophylaxis strategies to suc-
ceed, stockpiles must be adequate and their deployment
must be timed to cover the pandemic’s peak. If adequacy
and timeliness cannot be achieved, prophylaxis may result
in higher absenteeism than treatment only, which makes
the latter strategy a more effective option.
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Appendix 
Modified SEIR Model
The model was run across 365 days at time steps of 0.05
days. The equations used in the analysis are shown below; the
notations are represented in Table 1.
General Population
For the general population, persons move from the suscepti-
ble (Sg) to the exposed (Eg), infected (Ig), and removed (Rg) states
as shown in the respective equations below.
Where β is the transmission probability per day from an average
infectious person, Ng is the size of the general population, α is the
incubation period, and γ is the infectious period.
HCW Population
Transmission and disease severity parameters are deter-
mined by whether HCWs are given treatment and/or prophylax-
is. The use of treatment and prophylaxis is indicated by the
variables i and j, respectively. i = 0 denotes when treatment is not
in use, and j = 0 when prophylaxis is not in use, and i = 1 and j
= 1 denote when treatment and prophylaxis are in use, respec-
tively. The use of prophylaxis is conditional to the pandemic hav-
ing been detected and the stockpile, P, not having been exhausted.
Transmission Dynamics
For the HCW population, persons move through the suscep-
tible (Sh), exposed (Eh), infected (Ih), and removed (Rh), states as
shown below:
where Nh is the size of the HCW population. j indicates the use of
prophylaxis, so that when j = 1, HCWs have a reduced suscepti-
bility to infection due to the efficacy of prophylaxis in preventing
infection (ε1),  and  are the forces of infection acting on HCWs.
λh is the force of infection from HCW-to-HCW transmission
within the workplace, and is defined as the following:
where ω is the proportional contribution due to HCW-to-HCW
transmission to the force of infection, and ε3 is the efficacy of
oseltamivir in reducing infectiousness, which renders a propor-
tion of HCWs on prophylaxis noninfectious when j = 1.
λg is the force of infection from exposure of HCWs to the
general population during the proportion of their time spent out-
side the workplace. The force of infection is similar to that in the
general community, subject to the proportion of time spent out-
side the workplace (1 –ω). λg is thus defined as
λp is the additional force of infection from patient-to-HCW
transmission due to symptomatic incident patients as they enter
the healthcare system with pandemic influenza (occupational
hazard). No discrimination between the probability of acquiring
infection in the community healthcare or hospital healthcare set-
ting is represented, because the actual probability of transmission
in either setting is unknown. Influenza patients are assumed to be
distributed randomly among the HCW population and to have an
aggregated probability δ of infecting susceptible HCWs with
whom they come into contact, regardless of single or multiple
contact episodes or duration of contact. The rate at which new
symptomatic infections from the general population will present 
to the healthcare system at any point in time would be
Therefore, the force of infection for each HCW,  λp is as follows:
where Nh is the number of HCWs under consideration.
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1 =We assumed that the small population of infectious HCWs
did not affect the transmission dynamics of the disease in the gen-
eral population.
Absenteeism
HCWs who are exposed will progress from the exposed
state (Eh) to the states of asymptomatic infection, clinical infec-
tion (Ch), hospitalization (Hh), or death from the disease (Dh).
Only the last 3 states contribute to absenteeism according to the
respective durations off work as follows:
where η is the hospitalized proportion, σ is the duration of med-
ical leave in uncomplicated illness,  φ is the duration of hospital-
ization and subsequent medical leave in complicated illness, and
µ is the case-fatality proportion. ψ is the reduction in hospitaliza-
tion or deaths with treatment, and  χ is the reduction in medical
leave with uncomplicated illness with treatment; both these terms
are hence only active for values of i = 1.  θj+1 is the symptomatic
proportion and hence takes the value of  θ1 in the absence of pro-
phylaxis and θ2 when prophylaxis is used, reflecting the efficacy
of prophylaxis in reducing symptomatic disease ( ε2).
The number of healthcare staff in operation at any time is
hence given as
The proportion absent at any given time is
We ignored the contribution of new recruitments after the start of
the epidemic.
Incidence Rates, Start of Pandemic, and Use and
Consumption of Prophylaxis Stockpile
The incident number of symptomatic cases of pandemic
influenza in the general population, Vg, is given as
The pandemic is deemed to start when
where  ι is the baseline ILI rate, and υ is the detection
threshold. When Vg>υι, then the predetermined stockpile, P,
which is expressed as the number of days of prophylaxis stock-
piled per HCW, begins to be consumed in strategies that use pro-
phylaxis, i.e.,
In a prophylaxis strategy, j =1 when both conditions, Vg>υι
and P>0, are satisfied; otherwise, j = 0.
Absenteeism during Pandemic Influenza
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